Playing a more European style than it did in 1994, the U.S. team must garner results against a pair of difficult Continental foes in its latest quest for respectability.
Like most of the underdogs, the U.S. embarks for France '98 with high hopes and strong doses of trepidation. And, also in accordance to its unheralded status, it is pestered by numerous niggling doubts imbedded within broad, sweeping questions:
Is this hullabalooed 3-6-1 a smokescreen or salvation? Are those recent friendlies the real deal, or just so much shadow boxing? And which friendlies, if any, are the true indicators?
Does Gold Cup second place equal World Cup second round?
Has a nation of more than 260 million people finally assembled a cast of 22 players tough enough and sufficiently skilled to withstand the pressure cooker of a World Cup without embarrassing themselves and/or driving each other nuts?
Federation president Alan Rothenberg declared they had virtually no chance to advance; will the players prove him right or wrong?
We will soon know.
''I can't believe it's here already,'' says Jeff Agoos, cut in the final weeks leading up to the '94 showcase but in the squad this time around.
''It seems like only a couple of weeks ago I was on the beach getting dismissed by Bora, and here it is.''
To a man, the U.S. players and coaches believe this U.S. team is better than the 1994 version. ''We're stronger in all departments,'' says forward Roy Wegerle. ''As individuals, we're more mature. We don't have a bunch of college boys who were thrown into the World Cup, hoping for the best.
''Now, most of us have played in Europe, at some level, and we're fighting for a starting spot. Whereas in '94, there was one group, and then there was another group.''
Says goalie Kasey Keller, ''You have to have both experienced players and younger players, and we've got that. It's a good mix.''
But how good is it?
The sequence of matches
Face it: This is a imposing group, no question, and the mathematics do not favor the weaker teams.
This is the first World Cup in which two factors are melded: Three points for a win, introduced in 1994; and only the top two teams in each group advancing, which was tossed out after the 1982 competition but brought back with the increase to 32.
''It's not only a tougher draw [than in '94], but it's a tougher world championship,'' says head coach Steve Sampson. ''A loss by a lot of goals could be very, very damaging. If you lose a game by one goal, you stay in the tournament.''
It's conceivable a team could win two games, lose the other, and not advance! Say a group weakling loses to all three foes; the winners all finish with six points, and goal difference would be needed to separate them.
The same could happen to teams tying twice and winning once. Again, goal difference.
A one-goal loss to Germany might be a moral victory, but it could also virtually necessitate beating both Iran and Yugoslavia to advance. And German head coach Berti Vogts is acutely aware that although his nation's teams have a history of slow World Cup starts, a win over the U.S. virtually assures qualification, since Iran – which Germany plays last – should be easy meat.
A U.S. team desirous of silencing European critics has a glorious, yet formidable, opportunity.
''We have to prove ourselves in Europe,'' says Marcelo Balboa. ''We've proven ourselves in South America, now it's our turn in Europe.
''This is a team with more experience, now we have more big-time players. With that level, with that experience, it's definitely a team that's matured.''
Maturity fell short against Belgium and the Netherlands in February, and the Austrian team the U.S. defeated in April had lost – at home – to Euro creampuff Hungary the previous month. Macedonia is in Europe too; it tied the U.S. 0-0, then lost to Canada!
If Vogts is so paranoid about a poor start that his team plays conservatively, it may concede the time and space in midfield the U.S. needs to establish its rhythm. How often and how aggressively Germany pressures the U.S. is a vital factor.
Unless the Americans are completely drained physically and emotionally from battling the Germans, and are unable to match Iran's fire, they should win this game by several goals.
Yugoslavia is brimming with eager, brilliant attackers. It may have some cracks defensively, but to exploit those faults while fending off its supernatural skill in the final group game will demand everything from the U.S.
However, if Yugoslavia has beaten Germany and Iran by then, it could be caught indifferent. Talent doesn't always dominate. More likely, Yugoslavia will need only a tie to advance, and the U.S. has to break down a confident, fluid team without coughing up counterattack chances.
The 1996 U.S. Olympic team did a wonderful job in amassing four points with a loss (Argentina), a win (Tunisia) and a tie (Portugal), yet it wasn't enough. The same sum would be no less an achievement in France, but likely insufficient.
It's not a numbers game
All the numbers nattering can quickly wander off into pointlessness. Former Dutch international Johan Cruyff, when head coach of Barcelona, was so fatigued by reporters insisting he describe his system of play that he said something akin to, ''It's a 1-1-2-1-1-2-1-1.''
Then he paused as they scribbled, before adding, ''But that's just for the journalists.''
The 3-6-1 is old hat in Germany; many German teams play this system away from home, and it's merely a 3-5-2 with a second forward or extra midfielder instead of two frontrunners.
Having seen it, Germany can be expected to deal with it by clamping down on Claudio Reyna and bottling up the U.S. attackers.
Sampson, publicly at least, states this system best suits the U.S., and his strongest backer is Thomas Dooley. For good reason; Dooley has been lobbying for years that Sampson play with a sweeper, and that the sweeper wear No. 5.
John Harkes also battled with Sampson over tactics, but never believed Sampson had the gumption to bench him no matter how many times he came to meetings late or missed a bus. Fined several times, Harkes persistently tested Sampson's patience, and finally exhausted it.
But with a 37-year-old that likes to slide tackle and attack, as does his German counterpart of the same age, Lothar Matthaeus, a backup for Dooley must be close at hand. The logical choice is Balboa.
Could Sampson tinker further, perhaps sliding in a fourth defender while maintaining a congested midfield and lone striker in a 4-2-3-1? Spreading the defense wider, or employing a stopper, could also relieve some pressure on the flank midfielders who are unlikely to dazzle in the World Cup as they did in Vienna.
If the man-markers can win their duels, and Dooley tempers his attacking zeal with reason, the U.S. at least has some solidity at the back. It cannot hope to succeed against its European Group F foes if a decent, serviceable player like Mike Burns is matched up with a true international forward. Remember his bouts with Zaguinho and Romario, not to mention unheralded Israeli striker Moshe Glam. But for spot duty in midfield, Burns can be useful.
Still, against offensive juggernauts like Germany and Yugoslavia, relying on just three defenders – albeit all good ones in David Regis, Eddie Pope, and Dooley – is risky, as it requires both central defenders to hold most of the time, which could starve the attackers of service.
And the attacking corps is limping. Tab Ramos, Eric Wynalda and Brian McBride are recovering from injury, Wegerle – despite Sampson's flowery pronouncements – is playing like man burdened with weights on both ankles, and Joe-Max Moore is again being bounced between positions.
Frankie Hejduk's blistering speed often lacks nuances such as control and purpose. At this level, Hejduk's problem is defending. He can't.
Much is expected of, and needed by, Cobi Jones, recently switched to the left flank although more experienced on the right. His recent showings have tailed off following a good Gold Cup and a tour de force in Austria.
Sampson points to success with a man-marking system the U.S. used at the 1995 Copa America, in which the U.S. finished fourth. That U.S. team played with abandon and passion, imbuing the system with those other crucial components: intensity, cohesion, and determination.
Regardless of system, this team needs the right psyche to excel. It has suffered from fat-headedness in the past. It cannot afford any smugness in France.
Can the untried step up?
In dropping Harkes and benching Alexi Lalas and Balboa, Sampson has tossed away more than two decades of international experience. In their place, although not direct replacements, are Brian Maisonneuve (7 caps) and Chad Deering (10) – both players of great promise but unproven, since neither has played in so much as a full qualifier.
''Just because you haven't played there doesn't mean you're not capable,'' says Wynalda, whose own introduction to the World Cup in 1990 was somewhat combustive.
If they adapt to the mind-snapping pace, flame-thrower pressure, and fierce physical demands, the U.S. midfield core will hold firm. But the odds are against two untried neophytes, playing side-by-side, jumping right into the fray so smoothly, which rekindles suspicion that Sampson will adjust his formation and personnel.
Regis is a valuable addition, whether he plays at marking back or defensive midfield. He seldom was asked to cross the ball for his German club Karlsruhe, but he can also handle and pass the ball along the ground. He has scored goals on balls from club teammate Thomas Haessler; such experience may help the U.S. defend the German playmakers.
His major flaw is he has no clone.
And to score the goals?
The U.S. has no tried-and-true international striker, and while McBride's four qualifying goals look good on paper, his recent concussion and a quartet of misses against Macedonia cancel out the goal he scored in Austria. And remember, it was his miss in Brussels that cast his World Cup hopes into deep shadow.
A fit, sharp McBride could fill the lone forward spot, and allow Sampson to move around his attacking midfield pieces: Wynalda, Ramos, Reyna, Moore, Ernie Stewart. But without McBride, Moore is the best option at forward, although, like McBride, his recent form has been spotty. Always combative, and dangerous on free kicks, Moore has not played all that well while coming off yet another injury.
When his German teams played 3-6-1, Wynalda did not normally play alone on top as the star on the ''Christmas tree.'' Instead, he was the second forward. Moore has been used on the flank, and has the combative fire and technical ability to drop back deep into midfield, but is so offensively inclined that previous experiments with him at defensive mid didn't pan out. Yet if fit, he'll be out there somewhere, as will be Preki off the bench.
''We have elements we didn't have in '94,'' says Wynalda. ''Whether it be a player like Kasey Keller or Claudio Reyna, or a player like Preki, who can come in and make an immediate impact.''
Health for Wynalda, Moore, Ramos and Reyna would mask some U.S. deficiencies. Advancing to the second round, a shock in 1994, would make 1998 a resounding triumph.
(by Soccer America senior editor Ridge Mahoney)
HISTORY
Past1930 – semifinals.
1934 – first round.
1938 – did not enter.
1950 – first round.
1954 – did not qualify.
1958 – did not qualify.
1962 – did not qualify.
1966 – did not qualify.
1970 – did not qualify.
1974 – did not qualify.
1978 – did not qualify.
1982 – did not qualify.
1986 – did not qualify.
1990 – first round.
1994 – second round.
Record (W-T-L): 4-1-9.
Qualifying
CONCACAFGroup 1
USA 2 Guatemala 0
USA 2 Trinidad & Tobago 0
Trinidad & Tobago 0 USA 1
Costa Rica 2 USA 1
USA 2 Costa Rica 1
Guatemala 2 USA 2
Standings: USA 13 points; Costa Rica 12; Guatemala 8; Trinidad & Tobago 1.
Hexagonal
Jamaica 0 USA 0USA 3 Canada 0
Costa Rica 3 USA 2
USA 2 Mexico 2
El Salvador 1 USA 1
USA 1 Costa Rica 0
USA 1 Jamaica 1
Mexico 0 USA 0
Canada 0 USA 3
USA 4, El Salvador 2
Standings: Mexico 18 points; USA 17; Jamaica 14; Costa Rica 12; El Salvador 10; Canada 6.