Dutch clubs have won six European Cup titles, more than any other country can claim except Italy, Spain and England, but they face long-term problems because of the flight of young talent. While youth development remains critical, alternative business arrangements are now essential to clubs’ continued success.
The landscape has been drastically altered since Ajax last won the European Cup four years ago, but the challenge for Dutch clubs in the post-Bosman era appears not so different than it was before. The Dutch League remains a prime talent pool for Europe’s biggest clubs, but Ajax and its chief domestic rivals are finding that their ambitions to be more than that – to compete with their better-heeled cousins – have suffered from the influx of big money that has widened the gap between the continent’s few haves and its many have-nots. Unable as always to match the big spenders from Italy, Spain and England, the Dutch are finding their traditional solution – their glorious youth – has been hindered because their players are running off to foreign riches at younger ages. It’s a crisis of sorts – everyone involved in the Dutch game says so – but that doesn’t mean anyone’s panicking. Dutch wiles and patience, it is preached, should be sufficient to ride out the storm. “We are very creative in Holland,” says Remy Reynierse, PSV Eindhoven’s youth director. “We always want to have something more than the countries abroad, and the countries abroad live by much money, big money, many players. We know we have small money, very small number of players, so we must be very creative.”
Solving the post-Bosman puzzle
Dutch creativity has spawned six European Cup champions – Feyenoord in 1970, Ajax in 1971-73 and ’95, PSV in 1988 – and a thrilling, attacking style that has seen this relatively small land, with just 15 million inhabitants, become a world power in the sport. It is being called on now to solve the post-Bosman puzzle. It’s not a simple equation, and it involves far more than on-field considerations, everything from building foreign connections to maximizing facilities in an attempt to reap every last guilder. And it is about more than trying to compete in Europe – for clubs such as Vitesse Arnhem, Willem II and FC Twente, the fight is to be among the best in the Netherlands. Youth development, as always, is the critical component, and how Dutch teams deal with their young players has been altered in Bosman’s wake. In the three years since an EU decision opened European soccer to a form of free agency, Dutch clubs – unable to compete for high-priced superstars, powerless to fend off raids on their young talent – have withered in continental competition. Ajax, unquestionably Europe’s best team in mid-decade, saw its championship squad dismantled as big clubs in England, Italy and Spain feasted on its talent. It finished last in its Champions League group last season and limped to sixth in the Dutch competition. “I think for two years after the Bosman ruling, nobody knew what to do,” says Ajax general director Frank Kales, who surrendered Patrick Kluivert and Michael Reizinger to AC Milan without a transfer fee after the Bosman decision. “There were young players – we had to sign them. Now we sign every player to a five- or six- or seven-year contract. “Basically, we don’t take the risk of them leaving.” Neither do Feyenoord or PSV, the other traditional Dutch powers, which have improved their youth development and scouting systems to alleviate the talent crunch. The departures of so many young players, along with proven stars expected to bolt, have impacted the traditional Dutch cycle in which talented youngsters fill holes left by veterans, develop into top players and leave for bigger clubs, with new youngsters moving up to fill the gap. “Normally, before the Bosman case, players stayed here until they were 27, then they’d look to go to Italy,” says Ajax coach Jan Wouters. “But now these clubs are going to buy the players, like Kluivert or [Clarence] Seedorf, when they are 20 or 21. When they leave at 21, it doesn’t gives time for the youth to grow.”
The gap narrows at youth level
The Dutch game has been built on its youth systems, primarily that at Ajax, where the school – dubbed “The Future” – has churned out a breathtaking array of talent, from Johan Cruyff to Marco Van Basten to Dennis Bergkamp and Edgar Davids. “The only model,” Kales says, “is youth development … and Ajax is unique because of our youth development program. I don’t think anyone can beat it. There’s no real professional sports team that comes close to what Ajax has done.” Its influence on Feyenoord’s, PSV’s and Vitesse’s youth programs is immeasurable, and now all four clubs have relatively comparable structures. “In the past,” says Henk van Stee, manager of Feyenoord’s youth department, “Ajax was famous in that each year several youngsters moved on to the first team. Feyenoord did hardly know this phenomenon. The last few years this has changed, and the distance between Ajax youth and Feyenoord is getting less and less.” Vitesse, which has emerged in recent years as the fourth-biggest Dutch club, has poured money into its development program; it paid off with Dutch championships for its A (17-18) and B (15-16) youth teams last season. Ajax and Feyenoord, which like PSV have from 160 to 180 players in its developmental department, begin scouting for players as young as 6. “We only scout attackers,” says Hans Westerhof, who heads Ajax’s $2.5 million-per-year youth program. “Let’s say we scout four for the left side. The best one will be the left wing, the second will play on the left in midfield, the third will be on the left in defense, and the fourth is on the bench. After 15 or 16, we sometimes look for defenders. But at the beginning, you have to have technical skills, you have to have speed.” Those who carry on in the program are virtually guaranteed contracts when they turn 18 – Dutch players may sign pacts at a younger age, but foreign players may not – either at Ajax or with another Dutch club. Such home-grown talent is essential since buying top players from other lands can be tough. The price Inter Milan paid for Christian Vieri, nearly $50 million, exceeds the budgets of every Dutch club. “We never can buy Vieri,” says PSV assistant coach Ernie Brandts. “And [PSV star] Ruud van Nistlerooy, he’s a very good player, but I’m sure next year he’ll be in Italy or Spain or England, for sure, because we can’t pay that money for him. And we can maybe earn $30 million for him. “It’s difficult. The budget for PSV is 70 million guilders [about $35 million]. If you sell a player for 60 million guilders, you have already your budget for the whole year.” Van Nistlerooy, who scored 31 goals last year, says he’ll be off to a bigger club in a bigger league within a couple years. “I’m 23 now, and maybe I need three more years here to be a little more older and more experienced,” he says. “The Dutch League is not as good as the English, probably, but at my age it’s a good league [in which] to learn, to be experienced, to be better.” Dutch clubs also have created relationships with foreign clubs to mine talent and increase their influence abroad. Ajax owns a piece of Germinal (Belgium), Ashanti Goldfields (Ghana) and Ajax Cape Town (South Africa). Finding alternative sources of funding also in crucial. Ticket sales and merchandising help, and connections to the local business community also can be lucrative. Ajax increased its cash flow by selling 35 percent of the club on the Dutch stock exchange; Feyenoord added funds by selling “bonds” in which returns are tied to the club’s success.
Aalbers pushes Vitesse to the top
Vitesse’s plan to join the Big Three – Ajax, Feyenoord and PSV, which have won every Dutch title but one since 1964 – has been tied to construction of a marvelous stadium, the Gelredome, in Arnhem. It was the brainchild of Karel Aalbers, who took charge of the club in 1985 when it faced bankruptcy. Within four years, he had Vitesse in the top division, where it has finished no worse than sixth since; the budget has climbed from less than a half-million dollars to $25 million, its average attendance from 800 to 24,000. “We can say that the team is now very closely to the top of Holland, and now we prepare for the last step,” Aalbers says. “To do that, we realized we can’t do it on the same level as, say, other big teams in Holland. We’re not Ajax Amsterdam, we’re not PSV, we’re not Feyenoord. We did not have championships lying around. We never win the prizes, so we had to do it a different way.” Aalbers’ solution was the stadium, a multipurpose arena that could be used year-round, thus maximizing profitability. The Gelredome – with a retractable roof and a field that can slide out of the stadium, allowing use of an indoor facility without harming the grass – opened in March 1998 to raves. The facility features shops – as does PSV’s Philips Stadium – and a business center, which has become a key component of all the major Dutch stadia. “It was ridiculous to have a facility with a big investment you use only 20 times a year, when you have a game, and then the rest of the time the stadium is empty,” Aalbers said. Vitesse is working on breeding loyalty to the club throughout the Netherlands and into Germany, where two percent of its season-ticket holders reside. “Only massive popularity can bring Vitesse further and closer to the top,” says Aalbers, whose goal is to be among Europe’s top 50 clubs within a year or two. “The last step is so much more difficult. It’s the last millimeters, the last little things deciding if [we’ll be at] the top, yes or no. This takes time.”
by Soccer America
senior editor Scott French in Amsterdam
